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ARTICLES
POLICING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF BODY
CAMERA EVIDENCE
Jeffrey Bellin* & Shevarma Pemberton**
Body cameras are sweeping the nation and becoming, along with the
badge and gun, standard issue for police officers. These cameras are
intended to ensure accountability for abusive police officers. But, if history
is any guide, the videos they produce will more commonly be used to
prosecute civilians than to document abuse. Further, knowing that the
footage will be available as evidence, police officers have an incentive to
narrate body camera videos with descriptive oral statements that support a
later prosecution. Captured on an official record that exclusively documents
the police officer’s perspective, these statements—for example, “he just
threw something into the bushes” or “your breath smells of alcohol”—have
the potential to be convincing evidence. Their admissibility is complicated,
however, by conflicting currents in evidence law.
Oral statements made by police officers during an arrest, chase, or other
police-civilian interaction will typically constitute hearsay if offered as
substantive evidence at a later proceeding. Yet the statements will readily
qualify for admission under a variety of hearsay exceptions, including, most
intriguingly, the little-used present sense impression exception. At the same
time, a number of evidence doctrines generally prohibit the use of official
out-of-court statements against criminal defendants. This Article unpacks
the conflicting doctrines to highlight a complex, but elegant, pathway for
courts to analyze the admissibility of police statements captured on body
cameras. The result is that the most normatively problematic statements
should be excluded under current doctrine, while many other statements will
be admissible to aid fact finders in assessing disputed events.

* University Professor for Teaching Excellence, William & Mary Law School. Thanks to
Caren Morrison and Seth Stoughton for comments on a draft of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
After widespread protests of shootings of civilians by police officers in
2014, a broad consensus arose around the need to outfit police officers with
body-worn video cameras.1 Proposals to push police departments to
purchase and use these so-called “body cameras” obtained “overwhelming
support from every stakeholder in the controversy—the public, the White
House, federal legislators, police officials, police unions, and the American
Civil Liberties Union.”2 In New York City, the federal district court that
found that city’s infamous “Stop and Frisk” program unconstitutional
ordered implementation of a body camera program as a remedy.3 The judge
explained that “body-worn cameras are uniquely suited to addressing the
constitutional harms” of abusive policing.4 The New York City Police
Department responded with a plan to issue 18,000 body cameras by the end
of 2018,5 and New York’s mayor “promised to expand the program to all

1. Howard M. Wasserman, Moral Panics and Body Cameras, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 831,
831–32 (2015).
2. Id. at 832–33 (citations omitted); see also Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104
CALIF. L. REV. 391, 396 (2016) (describing the use of police body cameras as “a practice
hailed of late by scholars, politicians, and activists alike”).
3. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
4. Id.; accord Leadholm v. City of Commerce City, No. 16-cv-02786-MEH, 2017 WL
1862313, at *3 (D. Colo. May 9, 2017) (noting that the implementation of body cameras may
assist victims of police civil rights violations).
5. Gina Cherelus, New York City Says Accelerating Rollout of Police Body Cameras,
REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2018, 6:38 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-new-york-
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patrol officers by 2019.”6 Similar progress outfitting police officers with
body cameras can be found across the nation.7
The consensus is that body cameras will have a positive impact on
policing.8 Yet, the speed with which proponents embraced and implemented
the technology left a number of ancillary issues unresolved.9 Key among
these are the ways in which body camera evidence will be used outside the
police-accountability context.
While body cameras are generally
conceptualized as a check on police power, they also present a rich
opportunity for police officers to generate evidence in criminal
prosecutions.10 As body cameras become a routine part of a police officer’s
equipment, video from those cameras will become virtually ubiquitous at
trial.11 And as knowledgeable consumers of the criminal justice system,
police officers may be tempted to shape that evidence as arrests and cases
unfold. Early signs of this can already be seen in an episode in Baltimore
where police officers were accused of staging drug discoveries for their body
cameras.12 Another way police officers can generate evidence is by narrating
their activities and observations to highlight (or fabricate) incriminating
events for a future audience. A cagey police officer with some knowledge of
the evidence rules may seize the opportunity provided by a body camera to
provide a contemporaneous narration of events leading to an arrest as a
substitute for an inconvenient court appearance and generally unpleasant
cross-examination. And, in fact, there are already reports that “officers have
been trained to narrate events when they are being recorded.”13
bodycameras/new-york-city-says-accelerating-rollout-of-police-body-camerasidUSKBN1FJ34X [https://perma.cc/P772-NP2L].
6. Ashley Southall, Do Body Cameras Help Policing? 1,200 New York Officers Aim to
Find Out, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/26/nyregion/dobody-cameras-help-policing-1200-new-york-officers-aim-to-find-out.html [https://perma.cc/
6WJW-R86B].
7. See Jocelyn Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras: Defending a Robust Right to Record
the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1565 (2016) (noting that at least thirty-six states have proposed
some form of legislation involving “police-worn cameras”).
8. See, e.g., supra notes 2–4.
9. For a summary of the policy issues implicated by the sudden prominence of body
cameras, see Richard E. Myers II, Police-Generated Digital Video: Five Key Questions,
Multiple Audiences, and a Range of Answers, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1237, 1253–64 (2018).
10. See, e.g., State v. Plevell, 889 N.W.2d 584, 587 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (“A compact
disc containing body camera videos from the officers who responded to the 911 call and
attempted to resuscitate the woman was played for the grand jury.”).
11. For early examples, see United States v. Groah, No. C 17-00198 WHA, 2017 WL
6350283, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2017) (excluding a police officer’s statements on body
camera video on hearsay grounds); Greer v. City of Hayward, 229 F. Supp. 3d 1091, 1094 n.3
(N.D. Cal. 2017) (same); State v. Paoli, No. 44038, 2017 WL 361153, at *3 (Idaho Ct. App.
Jan. 25, 2017) (rejecting a challenge to the admissibility of hearsay statements contained in
police body camera video admitted as excited utterances in a domestic violence prosecution);
People v. Albertson, No. 4-15-0873, 2018 WL 2392858, at *1–2 (Ill. App. Ct. May 24, 2018)
(reviewing a similar objection).
12. See Evan Simko-Bednarski, Bodycam Footage Raises Questions in Baltimore Case,
CNN (Aug. 25, 2017, 5:48 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/25/us/baltimore-police-bodycamera-footage/index.html [https://perma.cc/PJ5L-8MNL].
13. NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, POLICING BODY CAMERAS 22–23 (2017).
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This leads to a thorny question that courts have yet to answer and that
scholars have largely ignored: whether police officer statements captured on
a body camera (“police body camera statements”) are admissible in court.14
Litigants focused on the events portrayed in body camera video can easily
overlook the admissibility of accompanying statements. Yet a statement
captured on a body camera that describes some relevant occurrence—for
example, “he is reaching for his pocket” or “your breath smells like
alcohol”—should draw a hearsay objection because it is an out-of-court
statement introduced (presumably) to prove the asserted fact—that is, to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.15 To overcome the objection, the
proponent of such statements will need to either identify a nonhearsay
purpose or point to an applicable hearsay exception.16 And since nonhearsay
purposes for a police officer’s statements about a suspect’s incriminating
activities are unlikely to materialize (outside of the police-accountability
context),17 the potential applicability of a hearsay exception becomes critical.
This is especially true in scenarios where a police officer’s statement—for
example, “he just tossed a gun”—narrates an occurrence that is not captured
on the video and thus constitutes a critical piece of evidence against the
accused.
The admissibility of police body camera statements hinges on how courts
unpack an unresolved tension in evidence law.
Statements made
contemporaneously with litigated events are generally admissible through a
variety of hearsay exceptions.18 For example, if a passerby sees a man
14. Apart from the benefits of such cameras, scholars focus on privacy concerns and the
logistics of discovery. See generally Marc Jonathan Blitz, Police Body-Worn Cameras:
Evidentiary Benefits and Privacy Threats, 9 ADVANCE 43 (2015); Mary D. Fan, Privacy,
Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits, 68 ALA. L. REV. 395 (2016); Kelly
Freund, Note, When Cameras Are Rolling: Privacy Implications of Body-Mounted Cameras
on Police, 49 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 91 (2015); V. Noah Gimbel, Note, Body Cameras
and Criminal Discovery, 104 GEO. L.J. 1581 (2016); Richard Lin, Note, Police Body Worn
Cameras and Privacy: Retaining Benefits While Reducing Public Concerns, 14 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 346 (2016); Ethan Thomas, Note, The Privacy Case for Body Cameras: The Need
for a Privacy-Centric Approach to Body Camera Policymaking, 50 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 191 (2017). For further discussion, see also Myers, supra note 9, at 1254
(“Confrontation Clause requirements may limit the use of recordings. Hearsay limitations
might require special instructions or redaction.”).
15. Hearsay is defined as a statement offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted in
the statement.” FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2).
16. See 30B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & JEFFREY BELLIN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 6712 (2017).
17. This Article focuses on the use of video footage outside the police-accountability
context. In cases against police officers, police statements about suspect activities may be
relevant for the nonhearsay purpose of establishing the officer’s state of mind. This will rarely
be true in cases against civilians. See id. § 6720 (explaining the abuse of the nonhearsay
purpose of showing the course of investigation); id. § 6833 (emphasizing the nonexistent
relevance of most statements offered to show a speaker’s state of mind). Another viable
nonhearsay purpose in both contexts will be criminal defense use of police body camera
statements to impeach contrary police officer testimony. When a speaker’s own out-of-court
statements are used to impeach a speaker, the statements are introduced for a nonhearsay
purpose; they are relevant regardless of their truth. Id. § 7051.
18. See infra Part III.
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walking into a bank with a rifle, the passerby’s exclamation to a
companion—such as, “he’s got a gun!”—would be admissible at trial as an
excited utterance or present sense impression.19 Yet, an official narration of
a crime or investigation, such as would be found in a police report, typically
cannot be introduced against a defendant in a criminal case.20 Thus, a police
officer’s report on the same event that contained similar language—for
example, “the suspect walked into the bank with a gun”—would just as
clearly be inadmissible hearsay. Body cameras present the courts with the
dilemma of reconciling these two scenarios. Is “he’s got a gun” admissible
against a defendant even when the observer is a police officer who includes
that narration in an official police record generated by the police officer’s
body camera?
To answer this question, courts must reconcile a series of inconsistent
evidence rules, ambiguous congressional intent, and an overriding
constitutional provision. The guidance that results is that police officers’ outof-court statements captured in body camera video can be introduced as
substantive evidence against a criminal defendant if the statements qualify
for admission under certain hearsay exceptions, such as the present sense
impression, excited utterance, or recorded recollection exceptions; and either
(1) the statements are “nontestimonial”;21 or (2) the police officer who made
the out-of-court statement testifies. Although courts have so far stumbled in
this context, this conclusion resolves the tensions described above.
Specifically, it reconciles a series of conflicting evidence rules, untangles
ambiguous congressional intent, enforces constitutional principles, and
facilitates the admission of reliable evidence. Thus, this Article is not another
dire warning about the incompatibility of aging evidence rules and new
technology. Instead, this is a feel-good tale about how normative concerns
about police-generated evidence map relatively well into an existing
evidentiary framework. All that is required is for courts, litigants, and
scholars to see through the evidentiary thicket to a refreshingly elegant
resolution provided by existing evidentiary and constitutional doctrine.
I. BODY CAMERAS IN MODERN POLICING: THE IMPETUS
AND THE IMPLICATIONS
“Police body cameras are compact devices that can create both audio and
visual records of police officer actions, observations, and interactions with
the public.”22 The cameras are small and versatile enough to be worn almost

19. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1)–(2).
20. See id. r. 803(8); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004) (explaining that the
Confrontation Clause requires the opportunity for cross-examination of testimonial hearsay).
21. For purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court has defined
“nontestimonial” as a statement “not made with the primary purpose of creating evidence
for . . . prosecution.” Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2181 (2015).
22. Dru S. Letourneau, Note, Police Body Cameras: Implementation with Caution,
Forethought, and Policy, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 439, 442 (2015); see also NAT’L INST. OF
JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A PRIMER ON BODY-WORN CAMERAS FOR LAW
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anywhere on a police officer’s person.23 Like badges, firearms, or radios,
these miniature devices are becoming an essential part of the modern police
officer’s gear.24 Notably, the rise of body cameras is not without precedent.
Another recording device, the dashboard camera (“dash cam”), provides a
rough historical precursor. The history of dash cams in policing and the use
of that video in criminal prosecutions can inform the likely treatment of body
camera evidence.
Prior to 1980, there were few, if any, dash cams in police patrol cars.25
Around that time, police departments began installing dash cams to help
secure drunk-driving convictions.26 A second, more powerful, impetus for
dash cams came in the 1990s over concerns about racial bias and profiling.27
At least in limited circumstances, dash cams could promote police
accountability.28 The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), through its In-Car Camera
Initiative Program, contributed the first funds for state agencies to acquire
dash cams in 2000.29 That year, only 11 percent of state police vehicles used
the technology.30 By 2003, 72 percent did.31
The “body camera revolution”32 or “body camera bonanza”33 seems to be
following the dash cam trajectory. The Police Executive Research Forum, in
conjunction with COPS, conducted a survey in July 2013 that revealed that
ENFORCEMENT 5 (2012) (describing body cameras as “mobile audio and video capture devices
that allow officers to record what they see and hear”).
23. Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera Revolution, 50 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 897, 901 (2017) (describing police body cameras as “[s]mall enough to be worn
on the head, ear, or chest”); see also NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 5 (noting that
body cameras “can be attached to various body areas, including the head, by helmet, glasses
or other means, or to the body by pocket, badge or other means of attachment”).
24. See, e.g., Devin Coldewey, Cop Watch: Who Benefits When Law Enforcement Gets
Body Cams?, NBC NEWS (Aug. 17, 2013, 11:08 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/technology/
cop-watch-who-benefits-when-law-enforcement-gets-body-cams-6C10911746
[https://perma.cc/Y7U7-M662]; Peter Hermann & Rachel Weiner, Issues over Police
Shooting in Ferguson Lead Push for Officers and Body Cameras, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/issues-over-police-shooting-in-ferguson-leadpush-for-officers-and-body-cameras/2014/12/02/dedcb2d8-7a58-11e4-84d47c896b90abdc_story.html [https://perma.cc/793J-FJHY] (stating that body cameras will
become “standard police equipment”); Dave Lucas, NY AG Announces Program to Provide
Funding for Police Body Cameras, WAMC (July 30, 2018), http://www.wamc.org/post/nyag-announces-program-provide-funding-police-body-cameras [http://perma.cc/HQ62-HZN2]
(“The devices have become standard issue in many police departments.”).
25. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, THE IMPACT OF VIDEO EVIDENCE ON MODERN
POLICING 5 (2004).
26. Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) advocated for the use of video cameras to
preserve evidence of police officer encounters with drunk drivers to improve the likelihood of
convictions. Id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. Id. at 5–6.
30. Id. at 6.
31. Id.
32. Fan, supra note 23, at 898.
33. Caren Myers Morrison, Body Camera Obscura: The Semiotics of Police Video, 54
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 791, 791 (2017).
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fewer than 25 percent of responding law enforcement agencies used body
cameras.34 That changed dramatically following the August 2014 shooting
of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. The resulting public outcry,
amplified by the rallying cry “Black Lives Matter,” marked the starting point
of the body camera revolution.35 In 2014, President Barack Obama proposed
a $263 million spending package to increase the use of body cameras, which
included a $75 million package to aid local governments with
implementation costs.36 In 2015, the DOJ announced the $20 million BodyWorn Camera Pilot Partnership Program as part of a $75 million investment
in law enforcement agencies.37 Not to be left out, in April 2017, Axon
(formerly TASER) offered all interested police agencies free cameras for a
year.38
These actions are having an impact. A 2015 survey conducted by the
Major Cities Chiefs’ Association and the Major County Sheriffs’ Association
indicated that approximately 95 percent of law enforcement agencies
surveyed already employed or were committed to employing body cameras
in the near future.39 By 2016, thirty-five of the seventy largest U.S. cities
had begun using or had committed to using body cameras.40 As of November
2017, thirty-four states have enacted laws regarding the use of body
cameras.41
The critical difference between dash cams and body cameras is the scope
of coverage. Dash cams cover only a limited area of view—directly in front
of a police car—and typically only come into play in cases that arise out of
34. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM:
RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 2 (2014).
35. See Seth W. Stoughton, Police Body-Worn Cameras, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1363, 1364
(2018) (noting that the usefulness of body cameras “was popularized in the aftermath of . . .
[the] fatal shooting of Michael Brown”); Wasserman, supra note 1, at 831–32 (“[O]ne
significant policy suggestion has emerged from the [Michael Brown shooting]: equipping
police officers with body cameras.”); Herstory, BLACK LIVES MATTER,
https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/herstory [https://perma.cc/PHC8-6RF5] (last visited Feb.
12, 2019) (connecting the start of the Black Lives Matter movement to the shooting of Michael
Brown).
36. Associated Press, Police Need Body Cameras to Build Trust with Public, Obama Says,
NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE (Dec. 1, 2014, 1:46 PM), http://www.nola.com/crime/
index.ssf/2014/12/obama_police_body_cameras.html [https://perma.cc/Z7ND-KSQ7].
37. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces $20 Million in
Funding to Support Body-Worn Camera Pilot Program (May 1, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-20-million-funding-supportbody-worn-camera-pilot-program [https://perma.cc/N8YG-856S].
38. Josh Sanburn, The Company That Makes Tasers Is Giving Free Body Cameras to
Police, TIME (Apr. 5, 2017), http://time.com/4726775/axon-taser-free-body-cameras-police
[https://perma.cc/E7GE-7YCT].
39. MAJOR CITIES CHIEFS & MAJOR CTY. SHERIFFS, SURVEY OF TECHNOLOGY NEEDS—
BODY WORN CAMERAS ii (2015). The survey population consisted of sixty-seven major cities
and seventy-six major counties. Id. at 1.
40. Stoughton, supra note 35, at 1366.
41. Alison Lawrence, What Does the Latest Research Say About Body-Worn Cameras?,
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES BLOG (Nov. 20, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/blog/2017/11/20/
what-does-the-latest-research-say-about-body-worn-cameras.aspx [https://perma.cc/SRV56EWT].
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traffic stops. Further, only a subset of police vehicles are equipped with dash
cams. This means that dash cams capture only a small percentage of citizenpolice encounters. By contrast, body cameras are small and mobile, which
allows them to go places dash cams cannot.42 With saturation of the patrol
force, body cameras will capture a substantial percentage of coercive citizenpolice interactions.
Body cameras have been touted as the gold standard in ensuring police
accountability and building public trust,43 and they have garnered support at
every level.44 The focus of the effort is to ensure police accountability. At
the same time, a prominent role for body camera video in criminal
prosecutions outside the police-accountability context is inevitable. As one
recent article warns: “Law enforcement has certainly become their main
function, as they’re used more and more to identify suspects and provide
evidence for the prosecution.”45
Understandably, scholars and the media have focused on the role of body
camera video in holding police officers accountable for unlawful shootings
and other uses of excessive force. Scholars have also highlighted privacy
concerns generated by body camera video that is made publicly available46
and the discovery obligations that are created when the government
monopolizes access to the video.47 Recognizing that there is no question that
video evidence of relevant events will be admitted at trial, scholars interested
in evidentiary implications have warned about the potential unreliability of
seemingly unimpeachable video.48 Largely ignored is the question of
whether and to what extent the audio tracks that accompany body camera
videos, and specifically police body camera statements, are admissible
against a defendant in a criminal prosecution. Part II takes up that
surprisingly complex question.
II. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF POLICE BODY CAMERA STATEMENTS
Police body camera statements will often constitute powerful evidence.
For example, a police officer may state on the video that a person stopped for
42. See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 5 (noting that body cameras “have the
capability to record officer interactions that previously could only be captured by in-car or
interrogation room camera systems”).
43. See, e.g., Fan, supra note 23, at 953 (noting that the focus of body cameras is “to
rebuild public trust and demonstrate police accountability”); Stoughton, supra note 35, at 1366
(noting that body cameras are deemed to serve two ends: “greater police accountability and
improvement[] in police-community relations”); Associated Press, supra note 36 (noting that
the White House stated that body cameras “could help bridge deep mistrust between law
enforcement and the public”).
44. Wasserman, supra note 1, at 832–33.
45. Martin Kaste, Should the Police Control Their Own Body Camera Footage?, NPR
(May 25, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/25/529905669/should-the-policecontrol-their-own-body-camera-footage [https://perma.cc/CZH4-YA9K].
46. Mark Tunick, Regulating Public Access to Body Camera Footage: Response to Iesha
S. Nunes, “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot,” 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 143, 146–50 (2016).
47. See, e.g., Simonson, supra note 7, at 1567–68, 1574–75.
48. See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 33, at 796; Stoughton, supra note 35, at 1378; Tunick,
supra note 46, at 144–46.
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drunk driving smells like alcohol or was swerving all over the road; a fleeing
drug-crime suspect discarded something in the bushes; an arrestee reached
for his pocket; a suspected conspirator signaled to an associate; or an arrestee
just waived his Miranda rights. The possibilities are as varied as the factual
scenarios that populate the criminal courts. In almost all such circumstances,
however, these statements constitute hearsay because they are out-of-court
statements offered at a later proceeding for the truth of the matter asserted in
the statement.49 Evidence rules generally bar hearsay, even if the statement’s
author (i.e., the declarant) testifies.50 The theory behind the prohibition is
that important disputes should be resolved through adversarial questioning
of live witnesses recounting, in the presence of the fact finder, what occurred.
Consequently, evidence rules discourage unsworn, out-of-court statements
that can be introduced without “cross-examination, the ‘greatest legal engine
ever invented for the discovery of truth.’”51
The hearsay prohibition, however, is not absolute. A hearsay statement
becomes admissible as substantive evidence if it falls within one of the many
hearsay exceptions.52 Statements captured on body camera videos, like those
described above, will potentially be eligible for admission under a number of
exceptions. Primarily, police body camera statements could be admitted
under the recorded recollection,53 excited utterance,54 or present sense
impression55 exceptions.
A. Recorded Recollections
Recorded recollections are the most straightforward example of how
police officer statements captured in body camera video may be admissible.
The recorded recollection56 hearsay exception permits out-of-court
statements to be introduced as substantive evidence on the theory that a
witness’s recollection of events at an earlier time will be more reliable than
the same witness’s later testimony from a fading memory.57 The exception,
however, is narrow. It allows the introduction of “[a] record that: (A) is on
a matter the witness once knew about but now cannot recall well enough to
testify fully and accurately; (B) was made or adopted by the witness when
the matter was fresh in the witness’s memory; and (C) accurately reflects the
witness’s knowledge.”58 Importantly, the recorded recollection exception
requires the declarant who made the recorded out-of-court statement to
49. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2).
50. Id. r. 802.
51. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1367 (3d ed. 1940)).
52. See FED. R. EVID. 802.
53. Id. r. 803(5).
54. Id. r. 803(2).
55. Id. r. 803(1).
56. See id. r. 803(5).
57. Id. r. 803(5) advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (Exception (5)) (“The
guarantee of trustworthiness is found in the reliability inherent in a record made while events
were still fresh in mind and accurately reflecting them.”).
58. Id. r. 803(5).
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testify.59 In the present context, this means that if a police officer testifies to
memory failure regarding a detail that the police officer earlier referenced on
video, the exception permits the introduction of the police officer’s out-ofcourt body camera statement. For example, if a police officer relayed the
reason he stopped a motorist (e.g., “you were swerving all over the road”) on
a video, but could not recall the reason for the stop at a later hearing, the
prosecution could introduce the police officer’s out-of-court statement as a
recorded recollection. The exception’s application is both clear and narrow:
the recorded recollection exception only applies if the officer-declarant
testifies,60 vouches for the accuracy of the out-of-court statement during that
testimony61 (e.g., “I always inform suspects accurately about why I stopped
them”), and testifies to a present memory failing.62 In addition, the exception
typically does not allow the statement itself to be introduced into evidence
but only read into the record.63 This caveat is intended to prevent the jury
from giving recorded recollections greater weight than other testimony.64
The requirement is easily accommodated for oral or written statements,
which can be read to the jury but not physically provided to them. For videos,
this requirement becomes somewhat unwieldy. The most faithful application
would be playing the police body camera statement during the witness’s
testimony but not permitting the recording to be admitted into evidence as an
exhibit.65
59. Id. r. 803(5) advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (Exception (5));
30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6853.
60. FED. R. EVID. 803(5) advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (Exception (5))
(recognizing that because the declarant must testify for the exception to apply, “the
unavailability requirement of the exception is of a limited and peculiar nature”); see United
States v. Porter, 986 F.2d 1014, 1017 (6th Cir. 1993) (“While Rule 803(5) treats recorded
recollection as an exception to the hearsay rule, the hearsay is not of a particularly unreliable
genre. This is because the out-of-court declarant is actually on the witness stand and subject
to evaluation by the finder of fact.”).
61. See United States v. Mornan, 413 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005) (rejecting the
admission of evidence under Rule 803(5) where the witness “could not attest to the accuracy
of her statement during her current testimony”); Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 416 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1998) (“[T]he witness may testify that she presently remembers recording the fact
correctly or remembers recognizing the writing as accurate when she read it at an earlier time.
But if her present memory is less effective, it is sufficient if the witness testifies that she knows
the memorandum is correct because of a habit or practice to record matters accurately or to
check them for accuracy. At the extreme, it is even sufficient if the individual testifies to
recognizing her signature on the statement and believes the statement is correct because she
would not have signed it if she had not believed it true at the time. However, the witness must
acknowledge at trial the accuracy of the statement.” (citations omitted)).
62. FED. R. EVID. 803(5)(A).
63. Id. r. 803(5) (“If admitted, the record may be read into evidence but may be received
as an exhibit only if offered by an adverse party.”); see also 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra
note 16, § 6857.
64. 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6857.
65. This would mean that if the jury will actually receive the video as an exhibit for other
purposes, such as to visually illustrate the incident, statements admitted only as recorded
recollections would need to be redacted. See id. (“In such circumstances, the [requirement]
should be taken to mean that the pertinent portions of the video or audio recording can be
played for the jury during trial, but not taken back to the jury room. If the jury, thereafter
requests to view the video or hear the audio, a court could rely on Rule 803(5) to refer the
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B. Excited Utterances
Excited utterances provide another straightforward example of a
mechanism for introducing police body camera statements at trial. The
Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), like their state analogues, define excited
utterances as “statement[s] relating to a startling event or condition, made
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.”66 The
exception “rests on the theory that the agitated mind is much less likely to
engage in conscious fabrication than the reflective mind.”67 Or, as the
Advisory Committee explains: “circumstances may produce a condition of
excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces
utterances free of conscious fabrication.”68 As one of the authors of this
Article has explained:
The key identifying feature of excited utterances is the emotional mindset
of the declarant. To qualify for admission under Federal Rule of Evidence
803(2), an out-of-court statement must be uttered “while the declarant was
under the stress of excitement” generated by the described event or
condition. This typically entails a foundational inquiry into the speaker’s
tone of voice and demeanor. Other factors include, “timing, age of the
declarant, characteristics of the event, and the subject matter of the
statements.” These factors are designed to get at the critical underlying
question of whether and to what degree the event spoken of by the declarant
was, at that time, generating an emotional response.69

Given the nature of police-citizen interactions, statements of civilians
captured on body camera videos will frequently qualify as excited utterances.
An important limitation arises, however, with respect to statements by police
officers. The excited utterance exception hinges on an assessment of the outof-court speaker’s excitement level.70 This means that statements of trained,
experienced police officers will be less likely to qualify for admission under
the excited utterance exception than analogous statements made by civilians.
For statements by police officers, only the most stressful events (e.g., an
officer-involved shooting or grisly traffic accident) will likely generate a
sufficient emotional reaction or, more precisely, foundational evidence of
such a reaction to trigger the exception. Statements by police officers

jurors to the court reporter’s transcript (assuming it records the pertinent statements). This
would ensure that, consistent with the intent of the rule, the recorded recollection is not
prioritized in the jurors’ minds over the live testimony of the same or other witnesses.”).
66. FED. R. EVID. 803(2); see also, e.g., ILL. R. EVID. 803(2); TEX. R. EVID. 803(2).
67. United States v. Ledford, 443 F.3d 702, 711 (10th Cir. 2005).
68. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (Exceptions (1)
and (2)).
69. 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6818 (footnote omitted) (first quoting FED.
R. EVID. 803(2); then quoting Guam v. Cepeda, 69 F.3d 369, 372 (9th Cir. 1995)).
70. Id. (explaining that judicial analysis of admissibility depends on the “critical
underlying question of whether and to what degree the event spoken of by the declarant was,
at that time, generating an emotional response”).
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regarding routine police activities, like traffic stops or arrests, will rarely
qualify for admission under the excited utterance exception.71
C. Present Sense Impressions
Given the narrowness of the recorded recollection and excited utterance
hearsay exceptions in this context, the most feasible exception supporting
admission of police officer statements captured in body camera video is the
present sense impression exception. As explained below, the present sense
impression exception, while nearly a century old, is tailor-made for the
introduction of contemporaneous narration captured on body camera video.
Its application, however, is also the most legally complex and normatively
problematic. Thus, treatment of this exception’s application to police body
camera statements requires more extensive analysis.72
The modern present sense impression exception is illustrated by Rule
803(1). That rule, and analogous variations in most states, creates a hearsay
exception for “[a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition,
made while or immediately after the declarant perceived [the event or
condition].”73 Qualifying statements are admissible even if the declarant
does not testify, and they do not require any showing of the speaker’s
unavailability.74
Despite its broad sweep, the present sense impression exception has
generated little controversy over the years. This is because it has been rarely
used.75 The primary reasons for the lack of use are practical limitations, not
legal obstacles.
Before any litigant offers a present sense impression, such a statement
must be “(1) uttered, (2) preserved, and (3) tactically significant to a litigated
dispute.”76 These factors are not easy to satisfy.77 One of the authors of this

71. See United States v. Hemsher, 893 F.3d 525, 533 (8th Cir. 2018) (“The execution of
a search warrant in the normal course of employment by trained officers does not constitute a
startling event.”); cf. United States v. Campbell, 782 F. Supp. 1258, 1262 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
(“Even for a police officer who presumably is trained to react in such potentially dangerous
situations, involvement in a chase with an armed suspect would be an exciting and startling
event.”); United States v. Obayagbona, 627 F. Supp. 329, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (“The fact that
the excited witness was a law enforcement agent does not preclude admissibility under the
excited utterance exception.”).
72. One of the authors of this Article has written extensively about the present sense
impression exception, and the discussion that follows about the exception’s origins is largely
drawn from that work. See Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, Twitter, and the Uncertain Future of
Present Sense Impressions, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 331, 367–50 (2012).
73. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
74. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 370 P.3d 1122, 1126 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) (rejecting an
objection to police body camera statements narrating a drug deal in progress that were offered
as present sense impressions).
75. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (Exceptions
(1) and (2)) (“Since unexciting events are less likely to evoke comment, decisions involving
Exception (1) are far less numerous.”).
76. See Bellin, supra note 72, at 347 (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803(2)).
77. See id.
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Article has explained this in a general context by contrasting the present
sense impression and excited utterance exceptions to illuminate the point:
The excited utterance exception applies if a speaker makes a statement
relating to a “startling” event while “under the stress of [the resulting]
excitement.” As a practical matter, startling events and excited utterances
frequently coexist. If a witness (a bystander, participant, or victim) is
present, a startling event will invariably trigger excited statements intended
for a broad audience: “Stop, thief!”; “An assassin shot the Vice President!”
Due to their association with an often significant event, excited utterances
are also likely to be preserved in the memories of others or documented (for
example, by police responding to a crime scene).78

Present sense impressions possess none of these advantages.
Contemporaneous observations are less likely to be uttered about nonexciting
events, and when they are, they are less likely to be remembered or
preserved.79 Thanks to social media and text messaging, this is changing.
Social media posts and text messages often recount unexciting events
(unfortunately for us all!) and do so in a manner that leaves consumers of the
posts with little ability to corroborate the initial observation.80 But social
media and text messaging are relatively recent phenomena. As a result, until
recent years, present sense impressions played little role in litigation due to
the practical limitations described above.
Police body cameras demolish these practical limitations. Body camera
video is, by its very nature, designed to be preserved. Thus, any statements
made by police officers during a police-citizen encounter will be available
for later use at trial. More importantly, police officers, aware of this fact,
may be incentivized to narrate incriminating, even if mundane, events for a
future audience. This means that the present sense impression exception
provides a ready vehicle for the creation and introduction of police body
camera statements at trial.
Police body camera statements fit neatly within the present sense
impression exception’s text. A police officer’s running narration of an
encounter, including comments like “the suspect is reaching for his
waistband” or “the suspect threw a gun as he began to run away,” at least on
their face, “describ[e] or explain[] an event or condition, made while or
immediately after the declarant perceived [the event or condition].”81
While certainly not contemplated by the drafters of the present sense
impression exception, police body camera statements also fit within the
exception’s rationale. The present sense impression exception rests on an
assumption “that contemporaneity ensures reliability.”82 Statements that
qualify under the exception are assumed to be both accurate and sincere. The
statements are accurate because the closeness in time between the perceived
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 347–48.
See id. at 348–49.
See id. at 347.
FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
United States v. Green, 556 F.3d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 2009).
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event and the declarant’s verbal description eliminate dangers of faulty
memory.83 The statements are thought to be sincere because the absence of
time for reflection “negative[s] the likelihood of deliberate or conscious
misrepresentation.”84
Police body camera statements also bring the added reliability benefit of
corroboration, something touted by the earliest proponents of the present
sense impression exception.85 Commentary urging the American courts to
adopt a hearsay exception for present sense impressions dates back to the
nineteenth century.86 An 1881 article by James Bradley Thayer, the
“granddaddy of the modern present sense impression,”87 explained that a
present sense impression relates “what was then present or but just gone by,
and so was open, either immediately or in the indications of it, to the
observation of the witness who testifies to the declaration, and who can be
cross-examined as to these indications.”88 Prominent scholars echoed these
views, opining that because “the person who heard the declaration [would
surely be] on hand to be cross-examined,” the present sense impression
exception constituted “an ideal exception to the hearsay rule.”89
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence cite these scholars in the
Advisory Committee Notes (“Notes”) that accompanied the adoption of the
present sense impression exception and explicitly endorsed their rationales.90
The Rule requires that a qualifying statement be made contemporaneously
with the event described and assumes (like Thayer, Morgan, and the other
commentators) that some measure of corroboration would typically follow
from that requirement.91 The Notes make this assumption explicit by
highlighting the (presumed) inevitability of corroboration: “Moreover, if the
witness is the declarant, he may be examined on the statement. If the witness
is not the declarant, he may be examined as to the circumstances as an aid in
evaluating the statement.”92 This critical assumption that present sense
83. 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6812.
84. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (Exceptions (1)
and (2)).
85. For a related example of the added benefits provided by videos, see State v. Plevell,
889 N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (relying on body camera video to determine that
“the boyfriend does not appear to be under stress caused by the event” and that therefore his
statements did not qualify for admission as excited utterances).
86. See Bellin, supra note 72, at 341.
87. Aviva Orenstein, Sex, Threats, and Absent Victims: The Lessons of Regina v.
Bedingfield for Modern Confrontation and Domestic Violence Cases, 79 FORDHAM L. REV.
115, 133 (2010).
88. James B. Thayer, Bedingfield’s Case—Declarations as a Part of the Res Gesta, 15
AM. L. REV. 71, 107 (1881); see also Edmund M. Morgan, A Suggested Classification of
Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229, 236 (1922) (expressing the same
sentiment).
89. Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence,
28 COLUM. L. REV. 432, 439 (1928).
90. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (Exceptions
(1) and (2)).
91. See Bellin, supra note 72, at 348–49.
92. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (Exceptions (1)
and (2)).
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impressions will be accompanied by some measure of corroboration holds
for statements captured in body camera video.
Unlike modern present sense impressions found in text messages and
social media posts, statements captured in body camera video bring some of
the same corroboration guarantees that were originally thought to undergird
the present sense impression exception. Police body camera statements can
be admitted with the police officer’s testimony—thus allowing “the declarant
[to] be examined on the statement.”93 And more importantly, even if the
police officer does not testify, the statements will be introduced through the
video itself, which can “be examined as to the circumstances as an aid in
evaluating the statement.”94 Thus, even if the officer-declarant does not
testify, the fact finder will typically see a version of what the speaker
observed (and could plausibly observe) when the statement was made. This
will impart information about the police officer’s ability to observe the
described event, and the precise things described. To the extent the described
event is not observable on the video, that fact will be ammunition for the
evidence’s opponent. In sum, the present sense impression exception will
serve as a ready vehicle to admit statements narrated contemporaneously
with body camera video. As a result, police body camera statements have
powerful evidentiary implications both for and against criminal defendants.
But this is not the end of the story. Part III explores the significant obstacles
to admission of police body camera statements—even if those statements fit
within a hearsay exception.
III. OBSTACLES TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF POLICE BODY CAMERA
STATEMENTS
This Article has thus far illustrated the ready pathway to admissibility for
police body camera statements. The examples provided, however, raise
normative concerns that counsel caution when admitting police body camera
statements against a criminal defendant. Of course, if those concerns do not
map onto the evidence rules, they can serve only as arguments to
policymakers to change the rules. However, to the degree these concerns are
captured in evidence rules and doctrine they can be given force to exclude
problematic police body camera statements. This Part provides a brief
summary of the normative concerns and then analyzes the evidentiary rules
that give force to those concerns.
A. Concerns with Using Police Body Camera Statements in Trials
Consistent with the public clamor for rapid deployment of body cameras
summarized in Part I, body camera video presents several benefits. For
instance, body cameras capture and preserve evidence for trial that would
otherwise be unavailable or left to the well-documented vagaries of human

93. Id.
94. Id.
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recollection and live testimony.95 Further, body camera video evidence is
considered “accurate and objective.”96 But the danger that juries will be
overly swayed by information and statements captured in body camera
videos raises serious normative concerns. This is particularly important
because the video produced by police body cameras will more commonly be
used to prosecute citizens than to document their abuse at the hands of
police.97
As Howard Wasserman notes, body cameras are described as a “panacea;
they are spoken of as the singularly effective solution” to police abuses
because “[v]ideo tells us exactly what happened, [and] entirely eliminates
the . . . ambiguity that often characterizes police-citizen encounters.”98
However, video is not as accurate as its proponents believe. For one, the
final product depicted in the video is different than what actually occurred.99
Additionally, video is susceptible to subtle manipulation at the time of its
creation.100 These shortcomings are especially concerning in the context of
police body cameras because the body cameras do not directly capture the
police officer’s actions and, instead, are suspect-focused.101 This is
important given a cognitive limitation known as “camera perspective bias,”
which results in something known as “illusory causation,” or the tendency to
overattribute cause based on camera focus.102 And because the body cameras
provide viewers with only the police officer’s perspective, viewers of the
video may subconsciously adopt not just the police officer’s perspective but
the commentary of the police officer as well.
Seth Stoughton highlights two cognitive biases that are relevant here:
motivated reasoning and identity-confirmation bias.103 These can lead
95. See Stoughton, supra note 35, at 1378 (quoting Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F.
Supp. 2d 668, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)).
96. Id. at 1393.
97. Letourneau, supra note 22, at 461 (noting that unintended consequences arising from
the assumed admissibility of body camera video evidence “could result in the degradation of
a defendant’s right to a fair trial by redefining the entire criminal trial process”).
98. Wasserman, supra note 1, at 833; see also Morrison, supra note 33, at 792–94 (noting
that the assumption that video depicts “objective truth” means, in part, that “we lack the
ingrained, institutionalized skepticism we bring to text”); Jessica Silbey, Cross-Examining
Film, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 17, 18 (2008) (“It is typical for courts
and advocates to naïvely treat filmic evidence as . . . a presentation of unambiguous reality.”);
Tunick, supra note 46, at 144–45 (noting that supporters assume that body cameras are reliable
and provide an objectively true account of reality or a “neutral third eye”).
99. See, e.g., Silbey, supra note 98, at 18 (“[F]ilm is a constructed medium. The camera
always presents a certain point of view and a frame that includes some images and excludes
others.” (footnote omitted)); Stoughton, supra note 35, at 1405 (noting that body cameras “will
record less, more, and differently than a human would see, all at the same time” through a
process known as video compression).
100. See Tunick, supra note 46, at 145 (noting that the person who controls “where the
camera points can manipulate their audience in subtle ways”).
101. Stoughton, supra note 35, at 1409–10.
102. Id. at 1409.
103. See id. at 1406. Motivated reasoning is “defined as ‘the tendency of people to conform
[their] assessments of information to some goal or end [other than] accuracy.’” Id. (alterations
in original) (quoting Dan M. Kahan, Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive
Reflection, 8 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 407, 408 (2013)).
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viewers of the body camera video to interpret evidence in a way that
conforms to their expectations.104 The incomplete and acontextual nature of
video evidence facilitates this gap-filling105 because visual gaps can be
readily filled with oral cues. Consequently, the fact that body camera video
evidence is elevated among other forms of evidence as more neutral and
objective becomes especially problematic.106 This could lead juries to defer
to the impression created by body camera video and any police officer
statements it contains.107
Once police officers know that body camera video evidence can either hurt
or help them, there may be an incentive to capitalize on their initial, unilateral
control of the video to generate favorable evidence (or suppress unfavorable
evidence). Police officers involved in shooting Stephon Clark muted their
body camera audio shortly after the shooting, which drew suspicion to their
actions.108 Similarly, in the 2016 shooting of Alton Sterling, both police
officers’ body cameras were “dislodged.”109 Recently, allegations surfaced
that Baltimore police officers reenacted the discovery of drug evidence for
body cameras.110 More broadly, researchers at the American Civil Liberties
Union found that as many as 70 percent of police officers violate body
camera policies.111 None of this means that body camera video, or statements
captured in that video, must be excluded from litigation. It does suggest,
however, that police body camera statements can be manipulated to create a
one-sided and potentially misleading account—an account that can be
uniquely persuasive. This danger becomes particularly significant if police
body camera statements are introduced at trial without the live testimony of
the officer-declarant. Such statements will be admitted with a veneer of
reliability despite never having been subjected to an oath or “the crucible of
cross-examination.”112
All of these dangers are familiar ones to the evidence rules. In particular,
the rules governing hearsay are designed to restrict the admission of out-ofcourt statements to only those statements that are sufficiently reliable to be
104. See id.
105. Morrison, supra note 33, at 801.
106. See Stoughton, supra note 35, at 1408, 1413 (noting that whether or not video
evidence is superior to other forms of evidence is debatable, but the danger is that people view
it as such despite its flaws).
107. See Tunick, supra note 46, at 145 (“The assumption that the camera is objective and
captures the most reliable evidence is likely to lead a jury or judge to have nearly absolute
faith in the credibility of video evidence and be reluctant to challenge it.”).
108. Alex Horton, After Stephon Clark’s Death, New Videos Show Police Muted Body
Cameras at Least 16 Times, WASH. POST (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-nation/wp/2018/04/17/after-stephon-clarks-death-new-videos-show-more-mutedpolice-body-cameras-delays-to-render-aid [https://perma.cc/Q4P4-URKB].
109. ACLU Questions Lack of Police Body Cams in Alton Sterling Shooting, CBS NEWS
(July 6, 2016, 7:30 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/alton-sterling-baton-rouge-policeshooting-aclu-questions-lack-of-body-cameras [https://perma.cc/4NVV-W2XR].
110. See Simko-Bednarski, supra note 12.
111. Laurent Sacharoff & Sarah Lustbader, Who Should Own Police Body Camera
Videos?, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 269, 290 (2017).
112. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
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presented to the trier of fact. As the next sections discuss, for the most part,
courts have the tools they need in this context. They need only navigate those
rules correctly, a challenge that is admittedly complicated by the overgrown
thicket of evidence doctrine implicated by police body cameras.
B. The Calculated Narration “Requirement”
The analysis of the obstacles to admission of police body camera
statements begins with a court-created doctrine that will undoubtedly be
applied in this context, even though it should be discarded completely. The
Seventh Circuit, and to a lesser degree other courts, read an additional
requirement into the present sense impression exception that has the potential
to exclude virtually all police body camera statements whether offered by the
prosecution or defense.113 These courts require that a qualifying present
sense impression be made without “calculated narration.”114 As explained
below, however, calculated narration is an illegitimate ground of exclusion.
Subsequent sections explain that other sources of evidence law, particularly
the law enforcement exception to the public records hearsay exception and
the Confrontation Clause, track similar considerations, which renders
calculated narration redundant as well.115
The Texas Court of Appeals applied the “calculated narration” concept in
Fischer v. State116 to exclude police officer statements captured on a dash
cam video. In Fischer, the court considered the admission of a police
officer’s running narration of a drunk-driving arrest, which was recorded by
a dash cam mounted in the police officer’s patrol car.117 The court suspected
that the police officer had consciously created statements for use in a later
prosecution and concluded that this disqualified the resulting statements from
admission as present sense impressions.118 Because the police officer’s
statements fit neatly into the text of the present sense impression exception,
the court had to invoke the exception’s spirit (not its text) to support
exclusion.119 On appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the
intermediate court’s decision.120 The Court of Criminal Appeals held that

113. This discussion criticizing the calculated narration exception to the present sense
impression hearsay exception in the body camera context tracks one of this Article’s authors’
analysis criticizing the exception generally. See 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6815.
114. Id.
115. See infra Parts III.C–D.
116. 207 S.W.3d 846 (Tex. App. 2006), aff’d, 252 S.W.3d 375 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
117. Id. at 848–49.
118. “It therefore appears that Martinez recorded his comments not as an objective
observer, but as a law enforcement officer, as a lay witness, and as an expert witness cataloging
evidence and opinions for use in Fischer’s prosecution.” Id. at 859.
119. Id. at 855–56 (applying the rationale underlying present sense impressions to
recordings of police officer’s observations on dash cam recordings).
120. Fischer v. State, 252 S.W.3d 375, 376 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), aff’g 207 S.W.3d 846
(Tex. App. 2006).
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the statements were “calculated statements”—a veritable “speaking offense
report”—inadmissible under the hearsay rules.121
Predictably, other courts disagree. In State v. Blubaugh,122 the Utah Court
of Appeals held that police officer statements captured on a video of the
defendant’s home were admissible under the present sense impression
exception because the police officer’s narrative was contemporaneous with
his perceptions.123 Similarly, in United States v. Rideout,124 the Fourth
Circuit found narrations by a police officer on hours of video recorded for
investigative purposes admissible under the present sense impression
exception.125 Neither case viewed the calculated nature of the statements as
disqualifying.
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Woods126 applied the calculated
narration gloss in a closely related context to separate out the portions of a
confidential informant’s narration of events on a recorded audio transmission
which were admissible under the present sense impression exception.127 The
court explained that:
Parts of Davis’ narratives are simple descriptions of events as they
occurred, which meet the requirements of the rule. However, some of the
narrative statements are clearly addressed to the FBI agents listening in via
the microphone. These statements were made for the benefit of the
agents—i.e., were calculated and provided for a reason—and are not
admissible under the present sense impression exception.128

This analysis tracks Fischer in the sense that the court is attempting to
distinguish between presumably reflexive statements that are admissible
under the present sense impression exception and calculated statements made
for a reason that are not admissible.
There are two problems with relying on the calculated narration concept
to screen police body camera statements for admissibility.129 First, the
concept is without support in the evidence rules. The absence of “calculated
narration” is not a requirement of the present sense impression exception, an
interpretation of any language in that rule, or an attempt to implement the
intent of its drafters. It is a judicial supplement to an otherwise clear rule.
The Seventh Circuit candidly acknowledges this, stating: “In determining
121. Id. at 376, 381; see also Eggert v. State, 395 S.W.3d 240, 243 (Tex. App. 2012)
(describing the police officer’s “calculated narrative” as a “speaking offense report”).
122. 904 P.2d 688 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
123. Id. at 700 (ruling that the police officer’s narrative on a recorded videotape of the
defendant’s home “was made while perceiving defendant’s home” and so “was admissible
hearsay” under the present sense impression exception).
124. 80 F. App’x 836 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1116 (2005).
125. Id. at 843 (rejecting the challenge to a police officer’s contemporaneous narration of
a videotape admitted as a present sense impression).
126. 301 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2002).
127. Id. at 559.
128. Id. at 562 (citation omitted).
129. One of the authors of this Article recently criticized “calculated narration” doctrine in
a treatise volume. See 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6815. Some of the following
discussion is drawn from that criticism.
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whether a statement meets the conditions of Rule 803[(1)], we have sought
to determine, in addition to the predicates listed in the rule, if the statement
was made without ‘calculated narration.’”130 This candor is refreshing, but
hints at the doctrine’s fatal illegitimacy.
Concededly, the roots of the calculated narration requirement can be found
in the present sense impression exception’s common-law heritage. In
Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis,131 cited in the Notes accompanying Rule
803(1),132 a Texas court noted that the hearsay statement under consideration
was reliable because it was “sufficiently spontaneous to save it from the
suspicion of being manufactured evidence,” and thus “[t]here was no time
for a calculated statement.”133 But to the extent the Advisory Committee
incorporated this amorphous sentiment into the present sense impression
exception, it did so by including a strict timing requirement. The Committee
explained that “substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negative
the likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.”134 Full stop.
As for Houston Oxygen, the Committee spent a grand total of two words on
the case and never suggested it had incorporated all of its asides into the
rule.135 There is no suggestion in the text of the present sense impression
exception or the Notes accompanying it that courts should, in addition to
requiring contemporaneity, weigh the degree of the speaker’s calculation.
You need not be Justice Antonin Scalia to recognize that a string-type citation
to a case in Notes does not provide courts with the authority to elevate every
comment in the cited case to a position on par with the text of an evidence
rule—particularly if the Committee was undoubtedly aware of the pertinent
language and chose not to include or even comment on it.136
There is little more to say about the practice of adding requirements to a
carefully codified hearsay exception. Federal courts, and most state courts,
simply lack the authority to reconfigure their evidence rules.137 The U.S.
Supreme Court has made the point explicitly:

130. Woods, 301 F.3d at 562 (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 249 F.3d 643, 646–47 (7th
Cir. 2001)).
131. 161 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1942).
132. FED. R. EVID. 803(1)–(2) advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (Exceptions
(1) and (2)).
133. Houston Oxygen Co., 161 S.W.2d at 476.
134. FED. R. EVID. 803(1)–(2) advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (Exceptions
(1) and (2)).
135. Id. (“Since unexciting events are less likely to evoke comment, decisions involving
Exception (1) are far less numerous. Illustrative are Tampa Elec. Co. v. Getrost, 151 Fla. 558,
10 So.2d 83 (1942); Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942); and
cases cited in McCormick § 273, p. 585, n. 4.”). For those keeping score, the “two words”
are: “Illustrative are.” Id.
136. For a sense of Justice Scalia’s views about reliance on even clear guidance in the
Advisory Committee Notes to override or supplement the text of the Federal Rules of
Evidence themselves, see Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167–68 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
137. See, e.g., United States v. DiMaria, 727 F.2d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that the
“scheme of the Rules” is “preferable to requiring preliminary determinations of the judge,”
which could result in “delay, prejudgment and encroachment on the province of the jury”).
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When Congress enacted the prohibition against admission of hearsay in
Rule 802, it placed 24 exceptions in Rule 803 and 5 additional exceptions
in Rule 804. Congress thus presumably made a careful judgment as to what
hearsay may come into evidence and what may not. To respect its
determination, we must enforce the words that it enacted.138

This follows from the general principle that rules of evidence enacted through
a legislative process must be respected in the same manner as statutes.139
Courts do not boldly announce that they have improved statutes by adding a
requirement not found in the text. Evidence rules are no different.
Supplementing the textual requirements of discrete hearsay rules with vague,
ill-defined requirements is particularly noxious as it defeats the very purpose
of codified evidence rules.
This leads to the second problem with applying the calculated narration
caveat to screen police body camera statements: the requirement is
incoherent. This is illustrated by how the Seventh Circuit in Woods seemed
to draw a line between the informant’s musings to himself (admissible) and
those communicated to police officers (inadmissible) because the latter were
calculated and the former (apparently) just oozed out.140 This would
counterintuitively suggest, contrary to Fischer, that a police officer’s
monologue on a body camera video would be admissible. Of course, many
courts would disagree—and there would be no way to declare a winner. This
is because there is only an illusory line between calculated and uncalculated
statements or, in the Woods court’s words, between statements made with or
without “a reason.”
The present sense impression exception itself is specifically designed for
statements that are not emotionally driven and instead represent calm
narrations of observed events.141 In each instance, the speaker must observe
something, decide whether or not to describe the event, and then choose the
words that best communicate the intended sentiment. Calculation is
inevitable and happens in the blink of an eye.142 After all, “[e]verything a
person says is calculated to some degree.”143 Any distinction between
calculated and spontaneous narration, then, is merely one of degree. This
reveals the calculated narration requirement’s “fatal flaw”: “the difficulty of
actually distinguishing ‘calculated narration’ from spontaneous description
in proffered hearsay statements.”144 The courts actually recognize this
problem, noting, for example, that “[o]ne can still make statements without
calculated narration even if made in responses to questions.”145 But that
concession gives away the game because “a response to a question is clearly
138. United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 322 (1992).
139. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (“We
interpret the legislatively enacted Federal Rules of Evidence as we would any statute.”).
140. See United States v. Woods, 301 F.3d 556, 562 (7th Cir. 2002).
141. See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
142. See 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6815.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 797 (7th Cir. 2014).
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calculated in the sense that the respondent must hear and understand the
question, and then formulate a preferred response.”146 This means that the
doctrine rests on an illusory distinction between statements made with and
without calculation. This freedom allows courts “to reject otherwise
qualifying hearsay statements based, consciously or unconsciously, on other
considerations, including improper ones, such as their views of the relative
merits of the parties’ underlying positions.”147 The doctrine contains an
unmistakable hint of the courts “assessing the credibility of the out-of-court
declarant, an enterprise better suited to the jury”148—something the
Committee condemns in another context as “altogether atypical.”149
In light of the imprecise and atextual nature of the calculated narration
requirement, courts should not rely on this judicially manufactured concept
to exclude police body camera statements offered under the present sense
impression exception. Importantly, many of the concerns that motivate the
calculated narration requirement can be legitimately operationalized through
other evidentiary rules and the Confrontation Clause, as discussed in the next
sections.
C. The Law Enforcement Exception
Courts seeking to capture the normative concerns regarding the reliability
and fairness of the introduction of police body camera statements can find
more solid ground in the so-called “law enforcement exception” to the public
records hearsay exception. The typical public records exception, illustrated
by Rule 803(8), excepts from the hearsay prohibition records or statements
of a public officer that set out matters observed while “under a legal duty to
report,”150 provided that the opponent of the evidence does not show that “the
source of information [or] other circumstances indicate a lack of
trustworthiness.”151 Critically, however, Congress amended the rule before
it became effective to include a caveat that precludes the admission “in a
criminal case [of] a matter observed by law-enforcement personnel.”152 This
law enforcement exception, in concert with the Confrontation Clause, is the

146. 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6815.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. FED. R. EVID. advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (Introductory Note: The
Hearsay Problem) (“For a judge to exclude evidence because he does not believe it has been
described as ‘altogether atypical, extraordinary.’” (quoting James H. Chadbourn, Bentham and
the Hearsay Rule—A Benthamic View of Rule 63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75
HARV. L. REV. 932, 947 (1962))); cf. Chadbourn, supra, at 947 (criticizing the Uniform Rules’
provision for exclusion of out-of-court statements not made in “good faith” as violating the
“time-honored formula” that “credibility is a matter of fact for the jury, not a matter of law for
the court”); Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Jurors’ Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay
Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 703, 704 (1992) (concluding from results of empirical analysis of
a mock juror study that “jurors are, in fact, skeptical of hearsay evidence and capable of
differentiating between accurate and inaccurate hearsay testimony”).
150. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(A)(ii).
151. Id. r. 803(8)(B).
152. Id. r. 803(8)(A)(ii).
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key evidentiary limitation on the admissibility of police officer statements
captured in body camera video.153
Congress added the law enforcement exception to the originally proposed
public records exception specifically to prevent prosecutors from relying on
official records containing police officer hearsay.154 The provision’s author,
Congressman David Dennis of Indiana, explained the rationale as follows:
[You] should not be able to put in the police report to prove your case
without calling the policeman. I think in a criminal case you ought to have
to call the policeman on the beat and give the defendant the chance to cross
examine him, rather than just reading the report into evidence. That is the
purpose of this amendment.155

Other representatives spoke in support, all signaling the same intent: to
prevent the introduction of a police report “without calling the policeman” to
testify.156 Congressman Jim Johnson of Colorado drew on his experience as
a prosecutor in state court to emphasize that “good cross-examination was
one of the principal elements in any criminal trial.”157 Johnson continued:
“If the officer who made the investigation is not available for crossexamination, then you cannot have a fair trial. I cannot believe the gentleman
would be saying that we should be able to convict people where the police
officer’s statement is not subject to cross-examination.”158 Congressman
John Hunt of New Jersey added:
The only time I can recall in my 34 years of law enforcement that a report
of an investigator was admissible in court was to test the credibility of an
officer. . . . We would never even think about bringing in a report in lieu
of the officer being there to have that officer cross-examined; but reports
were admitted as evidentiary fact for the purpose of testing the officer’s
credibility and perhaps to refresh his memory.159

Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman of New York expressed her
understanding that the amendment “reaffirms the right of cross examination
to the accused.”160
As these excerpts from the Congressional Record indicate, Congress
focused “on a prototypical potential abuse of the proposed [public records
exception], the admission of police reports relating to the charged crime in
lieu of live testimony from the involved officer.”161 Giving effect to this
congressional intent, courts do not permit prosecutors to introduce police
153. See 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6885.
154. FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee’s notes to the Senate Judiciary Report No.
93-1277.
155. 120 CONG. REC. 2387 (1973) (statement of Rep. Dennis). For a helpful compendium
of legislative history, see RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN & JOSHUA DEAHL, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE: TEXT AND HISTORY (2015).
156. 120 CONG. REC. 2387 (1973) (statement of Rep. Dennis).
157. Id. at 2388 (statement of Rep. Johnson).
158. Id.
159. Id. (statement of Rep. Hunt).
160. Id. (statement of Rep. Holtzman).
161. 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6885.
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reports by simply switching to related hearsay exceptions, like the business
records exception in Rule 803(6)—even though that exception does not
include a law enforcement exception.162
The more general question of whether individual statements made by
police officers can be admitted under other hearsay exceptions, like the
excited utterance exception, is complicated by Congress’s inattention to this
detail. Generally, failure “to gain admission through one hearsay exception
has no bearing on that evidence’s admissibility under another hearsay
exception.”163 For example, an “exclamation after a severe injury [would]
not qualify for admission as a dying declaration [but that] does not preclude
its admission as an excited utterance.”164 This follows from the general
structure of the rules. Hearsay prohibitions, like the representative Rule 802,
typically state that “[h]earsay is not admissible unless any of the following
provides otherwise.”165 Rule 802 includes “these rules” as one of the sources
of authority for the admission of hearsay.166 Rules like Rule 803, then,
provide a laundry list of discrete exceptions, preceded by the generic
language: “The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay.”167
From this structure, the everyday practice of courts, and common sense, it is
clear that it is not disqualifying if an out-of-court statement that fits within
one hearsay exception fails to qualify for admission under another exception.
It is expected.
The argument that, in the case of police reports, the law enforcement
exception trumps other rules of admissibility is based on Congress’s apparent
intent, excerpted above, “to restrict the introduction of police reports against
criminal defendants generally.”168 Exactly how far this intent sweeps,
however, is unclear. While the evidence rules typically enjoy a distinguished
status as refreshingly clear and cohesive, there are inconsistencies and
ambiguities. These blights are often, as here, a result of congressional
intrusions into the more comprehensive and precise designs of the Advisory
Committee. Congress sometimes acts without the evidentiary big picture in
mind and without providing thorough written explanations that round up any
interpretive loose ends. In this case, it appears that Congress simply did not
consider how broadly the law enforcement exception should apply. As a
result, the path forward requires divining Congress’s intent in the face of an
ambiguous textual command and a few generic comments on the House
162. See, e.g., United States v. Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[P]ublic
records . . . must be admitted, if at all, under Rule 803(8) . . . .”); United States v. Versaint,
849 F.2d 827, 831 & n.9 (3d Cir. 1988) (concluding that a police report was properly analyzed
under Rule 803(8) and citing cases suggesting the inapplicability of Rule 803(6) to police
reports); United States v. Cain, 615 F.2d 380, 382 (5th Cir. 1980).
163. 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6885.
164. Id.
165. FED. R. EVID. 802.
166. Id.
167. Id. r. 803.
168. 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6885. “Debate exists over whether a public
report inadmissible under Rule 803(8) is nonetheless admissible under one of the other hearsay
exceptions.” United States v. Nixon, 779 F.2d 126, 134 (2d Cir. 1985).
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floor. And here, the congressional intent to preclude reliance on police
reports does not seem to be all-encompassing. Congressman Hunt’s remarks
themselves suggest an area where police reports can be used—to aid a
testifying officer to recollect specific facts.169 The logic seems to extend to
admission of police reports under the recorded recollection exception.170
Further, a constant sentiment in the remarks of those who spoke in support
of the law enforcement exception was the need to ensure cross-examination
of any officer whose official commentary on an incident made its way into
evidence.171 This suggests that the law enforcement exception should bar
any hearsay statement by a law enforcement officer offered through
exceptions other than the public records exception, only if the following two
criteria are met: (1) it is a statement authored pursuant to the police officer’s
law enforcement obligations (i.e., “while under a legal duty to report”); and
(2) the officer does not testify.
Courts should apply this clear congressional intent any time prosecutors
offer police officer statements through a hearsay exception. Congress
undoubtedly intended the law enforcement exception to apply generally, not
solely to official reports offered under the public record hearsay exception.
The representatives who introduced and spoke in favor of the law
enforcement exception to the public records exception would find no solace
in the admission of a police report in lieu of police officer testimony simply
because the prosecution cited another hearsay exception. The clearest
illustration of this principle is that the prosecution cannot rely on the business
records exception to admit a police report, since that exception is just the
analogue of the public records exception for organizations that do not fall
into the governmental category. At the same time, police officer statements
that do not fit the public records paradigm, that is, are not uttered as part of
the police officer’s official duties (“while under a legal duty to report”),172
should not be captured by the law enforcement exclusion. Thus, a true
excited utterance by a police officer—such as “he’s got my gun!”—does not
169. See FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee’s notes to Senate Judiciary Report No.
93-1277. “State courts . . . allow law enforcement officers to ‘read their reports into the record
when they lack a sufficient present recollection to testify from memory.’” State v. Vigil, 336
P.3d 380, 387 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting State v. Scally, 758 P.2d 365, 366 (Or. Ct. App.
1988)). In such circumstances, since the witness purports to be testifying from a refreshed
memory, the hearsay prohibition has no application. 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16,
§ 6852 (“When the witness testifies based on a refreshed recollection, the witness is still
testifying from memory, as in any other presentation of live witness testimony. . . . If this
process is followed, there is no hearsay bar to testimony based on a refreshed memory, and a
hearsay exception is not required.”).
170. See United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 1986) (noting that the
admission of a law enforcement report as a recorded recollection did not prejudice
defendants); United States v. Sawyer, 607 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding an agent’s
memorandum admissible under the recorded recollection exception where the agent testified
and was available for cross-examination); Goy v. Jones, 72 P.3d 351, 353–54 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2003) (finding a police report admissible under the recorded recollection exception); State v.
Scally, 758 P.2d 365, 366 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that a police officer was permitted to
read a report into the record as a recorded recollection).
171. See supra notes 155–62 and accompanying text.
172. FED. R. EVID. 803(8).

1450

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

come within the prohibition contemplated by Congress. Such a statement is
simply not the type of public record, or official law enforcement statement,
referenced in the public records exception or the congressional remarks
emphasizing the need for a limitation. Present sense impressions captured
on police body camera videos fall somewhere between a public record and
an excited utterance.
To the extent a police officer narrates a body camera video to memorialize
and highlight information relevant to future proceedings, the statements fall
within the first criterion set forth above: a statement or report authored
pursuant to the officer’s law enforcement obligations (i.e., “while under a
legal duty to report”).173 These statements fit the mold of out-of-court
statements by a law enforcement officer that Congress intended to exclude
through the law enforcement exception. Thus, even if those statements fit
within hearsay exceptions other than the public records exception, they must
be excluded if the officer-declarant does not also testify.
There remains the question of whether the law enforcement exception
should preclude admission of these statements even if the officer-declarant
testifies. As the above discussion suggests, Congress’s primary concern in
this context was the admission of police reports in lieu of police officer
testimony. In that scenario, the defendant is denied the ability to crossexamine the police officer. When the police officer testifies, this concern
evaporates. The defense attorney can cross-examine the police officer about
any disputed statement captured in the video evidence. The congressional
focus on circumstances where a police report is introduced instead of police
officer testimony suggests the absence of a congressional intent to override
admissibility in these circumstances. Further, since the police officer can
review video prior to testifying, and prosecutors can introduce recorded
recollections of forgetful testifying witnesses, it is unlikely that important
statements captured in body camera video will fail to make their way into the
trial in some form during the recording officer’s testimony. The police
officer will likely testify directly as to the observations themselves. And to
the extent the defense attacks the police officer’s credibility, the recorded
statements may become admissible as prior consistent statements.174 This
means that if a police officer’s statements qualify for admission under a
hearsay exception (like the present sense impression exception) and the
police officer testifies, courts should not exclude those statements under the
law enforcement exception. There is nothing in the text of the rules that
would support that result, and the congressional intent to preclude such
173. Id.
[C]ourts do not interpret the “legal duty” provision to require that a statute or other
legal rule explicitly impose a duty on the declarant or agency to report a particular
observation. “Rather, it suffices if the nature of the responsibilities assigned to the
public agency are such that the record is appropriate to the function of the agency.”
30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6884 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 762 F.3d 852,
862 (9th Cir. 2014)).
174. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) (permitting out-of-court statements offered to
rehabilitate a declarant’s credibility to be introduced as substantive evidence).
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evidence is limited to circumstances where the evidence is offered in lieu of
police officer testimony.
Congress intended the law enforcement exception to prevent prosecutors
from introducing official police statements in lieu of testimony from the
police officer who authored those statements. This does not mean, however,
that if the officer-declarant testifies, police body camera statements (and
other police reports) can be introduced through the public records exception
itself (as opposed to through other exceptions, like the present sense
impression exception).175 The distinction comes from the text of the public
records exception, Rule 803(8)(A)(ii), which excludes law enforcement
statements without reference to whether the officer-declarant testifies. This
clear text trumps the above analysis in the narrow context of the admission
of police body camera statements under the public records exception. As
explained already, with respect to admission of hearsay under other
exceptions, however, the law enforcement exception’s application is (at best)
ambiguous. In that circumstance, it is necessary to examine congressional
intent more broadly, leading to the conclusion reached above that the officerdeclarant’s testimony is sufficient to overcome the law enforcement
exception.
D. The Confrontation Clause
The above analysis parallels the second legal doctrine that legitimately
captures the normative concerns about police body camera statements: the
Confrontation Clause.176 The Confrontation Clause trumps any hearsay
exceptions with respect to the admissibility of police officer hearsay offered
against a criminal defendant.177 Under the pre-2004 Ohio v. Roberts178
regime, courts swept aside Confrontation Clause objections by pointing to
the applicability of any well-established hearsay exception or generic
reliability guarantees.179 After Crawford v. Washington180 in 2004, that is
no longer the case.181

175. Cf. United States v. Hayes, 861 F.2d 1225, 1230 (10th Cir. 1988) (stating that the law
enforcement exception does not apply to the files in question “because Vest, the I.R.S.
employee who searched Hayes’ files and obtained the computer documents, testified at trial”).
176. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.” Id.
177. It should be noted that the analysis under the Confrontation Clause applies equally in
both state and federal contexts, as the U.S. Supreme Court has long made clear. See Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (holding that the Sixth Amendment “is ‘to be enforced
against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that
protect those personal rights against federal encroachment’” (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 10 (1964)). Thus, the Confrontation Clause analysis in this Article applies equally to
the states.
178. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
179. Id. at 66. This explains Congress’s concern, discussed in Part III.C, about the potential
introduction of police reports without cross-examination.
180. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
181. Id. at 68–69.
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Under Crawford and its progeny, whether an out-of-court statement
implicates the Confrontation Clause depends on how the statement came
about, or its “primary purpose.”182 The inquiry is an objective one
considering all the circumstances giving rise to the statement.183 If a
statement is made or elicited “with the primary purpose of creating evidence
for . . . prosecution,” it is testimonial.184 If the statement is made or elicited
with some other primary purpose, such as to evaluate and respond to an
ongoing emergency or as part of a casual conversation among friends, the
statement is “nontestimonial” and does not implicate the Confrontation
Clause.185 Thus, the reenergized post-2004 Confrontation Clause doctrine
prohibits hearsay that is otherwise admissible under many hearsay
exceptions, including the present sense impression exception. In fact, the
U.S. Supreme Court has already applied this doctrine in an analogous
context, ruling that a government lab report identifying a substance as an
illicit narcotic could not be offered under the public records hearsay
exception against a criminal defendant absent cross-examination of the
analyst who authored it.186 In language that is applicable to the instant
context, the Court said:
Business and public records are generally admissible absent confrontation
not because they qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but
because—having been created for the administration of an entity’s affairs
and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial—they
are not testimonial. Whether or not they qualify as business or official
records, the analysts’ statements here—prepared specifically for use at
petitioner’s trial—were testimony against petitioner, and the analysts were
subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.187

This same analysis should apply to hearsay statements of other public
officials (e.g., police officers) offered under other hearsay exceptions (e.g.,
the present sense impression exception). To the extent those out-of-court
statements were generated with an eye toward later proceedings, they would
be testimonial. This revitalized corner of confrontation doctrine will prohibit
the use of many police body camera statements, particularly those that
constitute self-conscious narration of incriminating events (e.g., “suspect
smells of alcohol”).
Confrontation Clause doctrine also provides a helpful shortcut for courts
attempting to divine the congressional intent in enacting the law enforcement
exception to the public records hearsay exception. The Confrontation
Clause’s directives largely parallel the law enforcement exception and
unequivocally override any inconsistent evidence rules. This is because the
182. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821–22 (2006). See generally Jeffrey
Bellin, The Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1865 (2012)
(describing the shift in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence).
183. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 360 (2011).
184. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2181 (2015).
185. Id.
186. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009).
187. Id.
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same concerns that motivated the representatives who championed the law
enforcement exception in 1974 animate the current Confrontation Clause
doctrine.188 The key question in a typical fact scenario becomes whether a
hearsay statement is testimonial and, if so, whether the police officer who
made the statement testifies. As this analysis comfortably tracks the similar
concerns that motivated Congress to enact the law enforcement exception, as
well as that exception’s text and application, admissibility questions will
often be resolved solely through application of the Confrontation Clause.
The Confrontation Clause analysis will often be straightforward. Police
body camera statements will not always be made “with the primary purpose
of creating evidence for . . . prosecution,”189 but they will often have that
purpose. For example, the police officer’s statements in Fischer, described
above, seem clearly motivated to create a record for a later trial.190
Importantly, the inquiry is objective—it looks at all of the circumstances
surrounding the making of the statement.191 Key factors for courts to
consider are the purpose of body cameras themselves—to provide formal
evidence of police-citizen interactions—and police officers’ general
knowledge of that purpose.192 The absence of other purposes for most police
body camera statements will also be critical. After all, why else apart from
generating evidence would a police officer be narrating interactions captured
on body camera video? In light of these considerations, most monologues
by a police officer describing events of evidentiary significance will qualify
as “testimonial.” But there will certainly be exceptions. In extreme
circumstances, such as those likely to generate excited utterances, the police
officer’s purpose in making statements may become nontestimonial.
A case that illustrates the hidden complexity of this analysis is United
States v. Polidore.193 There, the Fifth Circuit evaluated the admissibility of
an anonymous caller’s recorded statements to 911.194 The caller described
drug dealing going on outside his home.195 The Fifth Circuit deemed the
statements elicited by the 911 operator to be nontestimonial.196 The court
explained:
[T]he primary purpose . . . was neither to “enable police assistance to meet
an ongoing emergency” nor to “establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Rather, the primary purpose of the
interrogation was to gather information necessary for the police to respond
188. See Bellin, supra note 182, at 1877 (explaining the core of the new doctrine as
capturing the intuition that “[t]he Clause must, above all, prohibit the admission of out-ofcourt statements procured as substitutes for live-witness testimony”); see also supra notes
155–62.
189. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181.
190. See supra notes 116–21.
191. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 360 (2011).
192. Sacharoff & Lustbader, supra note 111, at 274 (noting that body cameras were pitched
to police departments as a “tool of ordinary law enforcement”).
193. 690 F.3d 705 (5th Cir. 2012).
194. Id. at 708.
195. Id. at 708–09.
196. Id. at 718.
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to a report of ongoing criminal activity. . . . [W]e conclude that the
declarant’s statements were not testimonial; under the totality of the
circumstances, the primary purpose of the interrogation was not to create
an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.197

This type of analysis may blur the line somewhat when police officers
communicate to each other and those statements are captured on a body
camera video. In such circumstances, purposes other than creating a record
for later proceedings become plausible. Because some other purposes may
be official but not testimonial, the law enforcement exception may still play
a role in excluding otherwise admissible police body camera statements. But
for the paradigmatic—and most worrisome—statements discussed in this
Article, where a police officer narrates events to no audience except the body
camera, the testimonial nature of those utterances will be all but indisputable.
Even if a court finds that certain police body camera statements are
testimonial, the inquiry does not end. The Confrontation Clause has no
application to out-of-court statements if the declarant testifies at trial. As the
Court explained in Crawford, “when the declarant appears for crossexamination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on
the use of his prior testimonial statements.”198 This means that even with
respect to testimonial statements, the defendant’s confrontation right is
satisfied by the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. As a result, if
the police officer who made the proffered body camera statements appears at
trial, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied. As noted earlier, this tracks the
analysis of the law enforcement exception discussed in previous sections.199
Police officer testimony also obviates Congress’s primary concern in
creating the law enforcement exception that the prosecution not present an
official record “without calling the policeman” who authored that record to
testify.200
The above analysis resolves the most normatively problematic instances
of police body camera statements. Efforts to introduce police officer
narrations of incriminating events without the police officer’s live testimony
will be blocked by both the law enforcement exception and the Confrontation
Clause. If, however, the officer-declarant testifies, police body camera
statements that fit within the present sense impression, excited utterance, or
recorded recollection exceptions201 should not be barred by these provisions.
E. Police Body Camera Statements Offered by the Defense
In some circumstances, the defense may seek to introduce police body
camera statements as evidence at trial. Police officers will inevitably make
197. Id. at 712 (citations omitted).
198. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004).
199. See supra notes 155–62.
200. See supra notes 155–62; see also 120 CONG. REC. 2387 (1973) (statement of Rep.
Dennis).
201. The same analysis would apply for other, less frequently applicable exceptions like
the state of mind exception. See FED. R. EVID. 803(3).
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observations and assertions on body camera videos that undermine the
prosecution. To the extent the defense offers such statements solely to
impeach contrary testimony by the same police officer, no hearsay exception
is needed. The statement can be offered for a purpose other than the truth of
the matter asserted: specifically, to undermine the testifying police officer’s
credibility.202 The defense may, however, also seek to introduce a testifying
police officer’s out-of-court statement as evidence of the truth of what the
police officer (previously) asserted (i.e., as substantive evidence). Or the
defense may seek to introduce a nontestifying police officer’s out-of-court
statement captured on a body camera video (e.g., a description of a suspect
that does not match the defendant).203 In these circumstances, the defense
will need to navigate the hearsay rules, even though the normative concerns
described at the outset of this Article largely fade away. The analysis will be
similar to that described in the preceding three sections except, critically, the
Confrontation Clause does not apply.204
Assuming a police body camera statement qualifies for admission under a
hearsay exception (e.g., the present sense impression exception), the defense
should have little trouble admitting the statement. Since the Confrontation
Clause has no application to evidence offered by the defense,205 the only
plausible grounds for exclusion are (1) the calculated narration exception to
the present sense impression exception, and (2) the law enforcement
exception to the public records hearsay exception. As already discussed, the
calculated narration exception applied by a few courts has no support in the
Federal Rules of Evidence and so should not be applied in any circumstances,
much less to prevent the introduction of police body camera statements by
the defense.206 The law enforcement exception, by contrast, arises from an
evidence rule’s text, and that text makes no distinction between statements
offered by the prosecution or the defense.207 As the rationale for the law
enforcement exception is solely concerned with prosecution-sponsored
evidence, however, courts are open to the argument that the law enforcement
exception has no application to evidence offered by the defense.208 Such
efforts set up a classic text-versus-rationale fight with respect to evidence
offered solely under the public records exception. The explicit text of the
Rule would prohibit the statements even if offered by the defense, while the
Rule’s clear and documented rationale—preventing unfairness to
202. 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6728 (“The statement is relevant to the
witness’s credibility because it shows that the witness said something that is inconsistent with
her present testimony. This theory of relevance does not depend on the truth of the out-ofcourt statement.”).
203. In the alternative, the defense may seek to introduce evidence that impeaches a
testifying police officer as substantive evidence.
204. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (limiting the right to confront witnesses to “the accused”).
205. Id.
206. See supra Part III.B.
207. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(A)(ii).
208. See 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6885 (citing United States v. Versaint,
849 F.2d 827, 832 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. DePeri, 778 F.2d 963, 976 (3d Cir. 1985);
and United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 968 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
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defendants—counsels an opposite conclusion. But as already discussed, the
fight will rarely be dispositive.
Most police body camera statements will qualify for admission under
hearsay exceptions other than the public records exception, particularly the
present sense impression exception.209 In that circumstance, it makes little
sense to apply the law enforcement caveat to the public records exception to
exclude the evidence. A police body camera statement that meets the terms
of the present sense impression hearsay exception, for example, should be
readily admitted when offered by the defense. For the reasons already
discussed in this Part, courts would be stretching congressional intent too far
to enforce the law enforcement exception to bar evidence offered by the
defense under another rule, that is, an exception other than the public records
exception itself. And, again, the Confrontation Clause has no application,
even if the police officer does not testify, because the prosecution cannot
claim any right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. The only
caveat is that in jurisdictions where courts disqualify statements offered
under the present sense impression if deemed to be the result of calculated
narration, this illegitimate barrier to evidence would apply even to defense
evidence.
CONCLUSION
The widespread consensus that body cameras are necessary to restore
public trust and ensure police accountability means that body cameras and
their resulting video will become an integral component of everyday police
work. As a result, body cameras will be used not just to protect citizens from
unlawful uses of force, but also to establish citizens’ guilt in criminal
prosecutions. Yet, the scholarly conversation has included little discussion
of this use of body cameras and largely ignored the admissibility of police
officer statements captured in the videos. In light of police officers’
unilateral control of body cameras, many of the scenarios courts encounter
will raise important normative concerns about the reliability and fairness of
the introduction of this evidence against criminal defendants. As explained
above, these concerns are largely captured by the array of evidence rules
implicated by police body camera statements.
Reconciling the various rules leads to the following guidance: police
officer statements captured in body camera video can be introduced as
substantive evidence against a criminal defendant if the statements qualify
for admission under certain hearsay exceptions and are either
(1) “nontestimonial” as that term is defined in the Supreme Court’s post2004 Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, or (2) the police officer who made
the out-of-court statement testifies. Consistent application of this framework
faithfully applies existing evidence doctrine to this new form of evidence and
largely protects against the most normatively problematic scenarios of police
body camera evidence. Against a backdrop of steady complaints of the
209. See supra Part II.C.
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unsuitability of aging legal doctrine to new technology,210 courts, scholars,
and litigants should celebrate this instance where existing doctrine, while
messy and complex, maps well onto new normative concerns. Courts need
only recognize that framework and apply it consistently in this novel and
important evidentiary context.

210. See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, eHearsay, 98 MINN. L. REV. 7, 13 (2013) (contending that
“changes in culture and technology have led to the creation of a vast, new subset of recorded
out-of-court statements that, while excluded by current evidence doctrine, cannot justifiably
be kept from juries”).

